









This paper analyses the relationship between changes in dividends and unexpected earnings of 
public companies exchanged in Northern Europe using dividend change data from 2008 to 2017. 
This study finds that dividend changes in year 0 are positively correlated with earnings changes in 
year 0, but for the following two years the correlation with earnings is either insignificant or 
negative under different methods. The findings are inconsistent with dividend signalling theories 
but stay robust under different specifications, suggesting that dividend changes cannot reliably 
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In this study I examine if future earnings of firms can be predicted from changes in dividend 
payments, as prior research has not comprehensively resolved the issue. There is a lot of evidence 
on market treating dividend changes as newsworthy, as stock prices generally go up when 
dividend increases are announced and vice versa, but whether the announcement has a 
significant effect on companies’ earnings is still under controversy.  
Miller and Modigliani (1961) suggest that when markets are incomplete, investors interpret 
changes in dividends as a managements’ signal about future prospects of the firm. Proceeding on 
Miller and Modigliani’s view on asymmetric information, among others Bhattacharya (1979), 
Miller and Rock (1985) and John and Williams (1985) suggest dividends being signals about future 
earnings, sent on purpose by the management at a cost to its stockholders. 
To support the dividend signalling theory, companies cannot easily try to signal better future 
growth prospects than they are actually expecting. If a company tries to pay higher dividends than 
they are sustainably capable of, they are likely to experience high costs in the future, as they could 
face illiquidity and leverage problems among others, that will be discovered by the investors, 
driving the stock prices down. 
Opposingly, Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) only observe weak correlation between 
dividend changes and future earnings growth, thereby challenging the signalling function of 
dividends. Grullon, Michaely and Benartzi (2003) also examine whether change in dividend could 
be used as a factor on forecasting earnings changes but find that the model does not perform 
better than others.  
This thesis investigates if changes in dividend payments have explanatory power in predicting 
firms’ earnings growth in the following two years. Most of the research on this topic is several 
decades old and is based on companies in the US market, which is why I employ a more recent 
data set that examines public companies traded in Northern Europe. 
In this study, no positive relationship is identified between dividend changes and future earnings 
changes, as dividend changes do not manage to significantly explain positive future earnings in 
any of the regressions conducted. The findings object dividend signalling theory and are 
consistent with studies by DeAngelo and Skinner (1996), Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) and 
Grullon, Michaely and Benartzi (2003). 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, I introduce the existing literature 
on dividend signalling theory and generally the relationship between dividends and earnings, also 
stating the main hypotheses. In Section 3, I describe the chosen data set and distribution of the 
main variables. In Section 4, I will be discussing the methodology and results of the empirical part 
of the study. In Section 5, the thesis is concluded. 
2. Literature review 
“The nearly universal policy of paying substantial dividends is the primary puzzle in the 
economics of corporate finance.” -Feldstein and Green (1979) 
Dividends pay-out has always been an important topic in corporate finance. Generally, dividend 
payments are used to distribute profits from a corporation to its shareholders for exposing their 
capital to the risks of the firms and to convey information about the company’s current 
performance. Asquith and Mullins (1986) propose that investors demand regular signals from the 
managements, or they become disappointed, leading to negative impact on stock prices. 
However, residual dividend theory suggests that high dividend payments indicate that the 
companies do not have profitable investment opportunities left, leading to lower expected future 
earnings (Keown, Scott, Martin and Petty, 2000). 
2.1 Dividends as signals 
The dividend signalling theory was first introduced by Lintner (1956), arguing that managers aim 
to keep dividend streams constant, only increasing them if there is believed to be a permanent 
increase in earnings and if it would be possible to maintain distributing the increased level of 
dividends. Ogden, Jen and O’Connor (2003) find evidence to support the dividend smoothing 
theory, as empirical tests indicate that firms tend to maintain dividends stable even over periods 
where earnings are volatile. The study also finds that the market reacts more sensitively to 
decreases in dividends compared to increases, which supports Lintner’s proposition on managers 
preferring to stabilize dividend payments. 
As dividends are usually paid from companies’ retained earnings and because managements aim 
to sustain stable dividend payments, it can be concluded that changes in dividends can signal the 
markets about management’s perceived development of earnings. Watts (1973) however, 
reports that while there is a positive relationship between dividends and earnings, the size of the 
earnings change is minor, and the information sent to the market is trivial.  
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Asquith and Mullins (1986) suggest that distributing a greater portion of company’s profits as 
dividends informs the investors that the operations are generating cash, instead of them having 
to rely on accounting numbers, which can be manipulated by managers. Increasing trend in 
dividends also encourages management to enhance operations and perform well to avoid 
negative market reactions caused by decreased dividends. 
In addition, as Jensen (1986) and Zhou and Ruland (2006) suggest, companies that have plenty of 
excess cash, are prone to managers’ “empire building” and overinvesting in unprofitable “pet 
projects”, possibly leading to poor earnings growth in the future. High dividend payments reduce 
these agency problems, as the managers have less cash to spend, meaning that the investment 
decisions are likely to be more efficient for the company. 
2.2 Evidence favouring the dividend signalling theory 
Asquith and Mullins (1983) investigate the effects of dividend initiations and omissions on stock 
prices. Their findings are consistent with views that suggest dividends to convey valuable 
information to the market, as they concluded that dividend payments are strongly correlated with 
managements’ views on the future prospects of the firms. They also find that the size of the 
dividend signal correlates with the size of excess returns. 
Healy and Palepu (1988) investigate the correlation of dividend initiations and omissions on 
earnings and stock returns. They find that dividend initiating firms have positive earnings changes 
in the years before and after the change, while for dividend omitting firms the changes are 
negative. However, they also find that the dividend omitting firms recover from the earnings 
decreases soon after the omission in the years following, noting also that part of the recovery 
might be explained by survival bias. The article concluded that the market treats dividend changes 
as managers’ signals about future earnings. 
Nissim and Ziv (2001) conducted regression analyses on dividend changes and earnings changes 
to investigate the explanatory power of dividend changes. Controlling the results with accounting 
data, they find dividend changes to convey information to the market, as they are positively 
correlated with subsequent earnings changes of the following two years. Manakyan and Carroll 
(1990), also find dividend changes to signal about future earnings, however only recognizing the 
effect on two following quarters. 
Arnott and Asness (2003) inspect if dividend pay-out ratios can help at forecasting future 
aggregate earnings growth on market portfolio level. Their empirical research suggests high 
dividend pay-out ratios to correlate with fast earnings growth, contradicting with views on 
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substantial reinvestment of retained earnings leading to high earnings growth. Zhou and Ruland 
(2006) contributed to the research of Arnott and Asness (2003) by conducting similar analysis on 
company level pay-out ratios and earnings growth, as they believe that aggregate results may 
differ from company level results. Nevertheless, their findings support the aggregate level results, 
completing the analysis and thus, providing strong evidence on dividend pay-out ratios having a 
positive relationship between future earnings growth, even suggesting that low pay-out ratios 
may result in inefficient empire building by managers. 
2.3 Evidence opposing the dividend signalling theory 
Watts (1973) reckons among the first ones to empirically inspect the relationship of changes in 
dividends and changes in earnings. The tests are about whether dividends have explanatory 
power on predicting earnings by regressing year 1 earnings on year 0 dividends. The finding is 
that while there is a positive correlation, the change in unexpected earnings is very small. Further 
examination accounting for changes in stock prices concludes that the information conveyed to 
the market is trivial, as the information does not exceed transaction costs. Gonedes (1978) 
performed a similar study, finding complementary results. Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997), 
however criticize Watts (1973) for relying on a small number of observations. 
Using similar methods as Nissim and Ziv (2001), Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) find entirely 
opposite results, proposing that the relationship between dividend changes and future earnings 
changes is non-existent. Their results suggest that dividends are strongly correlated with current 
and previous year’s earnings, but even when dividing dividend increasing companies to quantiles, 
significant positive relationship with future earnings is not found in any of the groups. Moreover, 
the results show that dividend decreasing firms that face negative changes in earnings in year 0, 
experience positive earnings change in the next year. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) study firms whose annual earnings had declined after 
nine or more years of consecutive growth, and find no evidence favouring the dividend signalling 
theory. Rather, they find dividends to be unreliable signals because managers occasionally tend 
to overestimate future earnings and only make modest cash commitments when they increase 
dividends, weakening the reliability of the signal.  
Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) survey and interview hundreds of financial executives 
and find that managers do not use dividends to signal about future earnings, rather determining 
the dividend level to reflect investment opportunities. Many managers also prefer to use excess 
cash on share repurchases compared to dividend increases, as they are thought to be more 




The dividend signalling theory has been under controversy for decades as there is empirical 
evidence both for and against its functionality. The key questions in this paper are whether 
dividend changes convey informational content about future earnings and if the magnitude of 
the dividend change affects the magnitude of changes in future earnings. Following the preceding 
discussion, this study outlines two main hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Companies that increase their dividends will have a positive change in future 
unexpected earnings in comparison to companies with no changes in dividends. 
The dividend signalling theory suggests that managements change dividends to signal the market 
about changes in expected future earnings. The stock market also tends to react positively to 
dividend increases and negatively to decreases, implying that the market trets dividends as having 
informational value on future profitability. 
Hypothesis 2: A greater change in dividends will lead to a greater change in future unexpected 
earnings. 
On the notion of asymmetric information, several signalling costs are identified regarding paying 
dividends. Bhattacharya (1979) states the cost to be ascending risk of having to issue new shares, 
Miller and Rock (1985) present the cost to be missed investment opportunities and Bernheim 
(1991) expresses the cost to be the higher tax rate on dividends compared to capital gains. If 
signalling about earnings is costly, and the cost of the signal is based on the amount of dividends 
paid, then a larger signal should imply a greater change in future earnings. 
3. Sample and data 
The researched main sample consists of yearly dividend change and earnings change data of 
public companies exchanged in Northern Europe (as per United Nations geoscheme) from 2008-
2019. I also use smaller secondary samples of firms that, in addition, have sufficient accounting 
data to control regressions. The main sample includes 6845 observations on dividend changes. 
The data sample excludes all dividend omissions. To avoid outlier observations affecting the 
outcome of the study, 0.5% of the highest and lowest values of dividend changes and earnings 
changes were winsorized to the values of 0.5th and 99.5th percentiles. All data is collected from 
Refinitiv Eikon database. 
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3.1 Distribution of variables  
Distributions for dividend and earnings variables are reported in Table 1. This study defines 
earnings as the firms’ net income before extraordinary items, and dividends as the firms’ annual 
dividend per share. For the year of the dividend change, the firms which increased their dividends 
the most, have slightly higher median earnings than the no-change and dividend decreasing 
groups. The magnitude of the change in dividend also correlates with the median earnings. Both 
of these findings are in line with the article from Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997). 
For the companies in the sample, the median earnings deflated by market value of equity is 
6.12%, indicating an average P/E-ratio of 16.3. Nonetheless, the only notable difference in 
comparison to data samples by Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) and Nissim and Ziv (2001), 
is that the sample in this paper has relatively less no-change observations for dividends. 
3.2 Control variables 
As a support on inspecting the relationship between dividend changes and earnings in the 
regression analyses, this study exploits five additional control variables. All the control variables 
are supported by research of Ou and Penman (1989), and the variable selection is made regarding 
the availability of data. All the control variables in the regressions are from the year prior to the 
earnings change observation, to reflect information that is already known by the market, before 
the earnings announcement. 
The first control variable used is return on equity, as Nissim and Ziv (2001) suggest it to be the 
most important factor to control for when investigating the relationship between dividend 
changes and earnings. Ou and Penman (1989) report that return on equity is likely to be 
negatively correlated with earnings. 
The second control variable is return on assets, which Zhou and Ruland (2006) have demonstrated 
to be negatively correlated to earnings, as companies that are already highly profitable, find it 
harder to keep increasing earnings. The third control variable is gross profit margin, representing 
the percentage that the company retains from the revenue after the production’s direct costs. 
Ou and Penman (1989) report the gross margin to likely be positively correlated with earnings. 
The fourth control variable is percentage change in revenue. Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) 
express that relative changes in revenue is likely to be positively correlated with earnings. As the 
fifth control variable is debt to equity ratio, which Ou and Penman (1989) expect to be negatively 





Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
The main sample contains 6845 dividend change observations from public companies exchanged in Northern Europe 
between 2008-2017. Panel A presents the cross-sectional distribution of the dividend and earnings variables; and 
Panel B shows the distribution of the number of dividend change observations throughout the years. In Panel A, for 
each variable, P1 represents the 1st percentile of the distribution (i.e. 1% of the observations are of a lower value), 
P10 is the tenth percentile, Q1 is the first quartile, Q3 is the third quartile, P90 is the 90th percentile and P99 is the 
99th percentile. ∆ in earnings is the annual change in earnings before extraordinary items, deflated by the market 
capitalization of the firm in the beginning of the year, as a percentage. Earnings are defined as net income before 
extraordinary items, deflated by the market capitalization of the firm, as a percentage. For earnings, observations are 
divided to seven groups by the magnitude of change in dividends. Dividends are measured as the dividend per share 
divided by the company’s share price as a percentage. ∆ in dividend is the change in dividend per share deflated by 
share price at the beginning of year 0, as a percentage. ∆ in dividend deflated by div. rather than share price is the 
percentage change in annual dividend per share. 
Panel A: Distribution of Variables 
Variable P1 P10 Q1 Median Q3 P90 P99 
∆ in earnings    -30.52     -6.96     -1.63      0.50      2.57      7.66     41.37 
Earnings: All    -57.08      0.56      3.91      6.12      9.18     14.33     38.10 
   Decreases    -99.88     -5.52      2.85      5.71      9.73     16.90     46.60 
   No-change    -76.97     -0.90      3.03      5.42      7.55     10.66     25.22 
   Increases: quintile 1    -21.63      0.99      3.94      5.93      8.87     13.31     28.89 
   Increases: quintile 2    -40.50      2.03      4.09      6.22      9.08     13.50     32.40 
   Increases: quintile 3    -17.89      2.14      4.14      6.18      8.95     13.47     35.52 
   Increases: quintile 4    -16.98      2.69      4.40      6.31      8.93     12.85     30.54 
   Increases: quintile 5    -19.03      1.83      4.55      6.81     10.38     15.89     43.60 
Dividends      0.48      1.41      2.32      3.59      5.23      7.50     24.50 
   ∆ in dividend: decreases only    -14.27     -3.63     -1.55     -0.44     -0.15     -0.06     -0.01 
   ∆ in dividend: increases only      0.02      0.10      0.21      0.46      0.94      2.02     10.62 
   ∆ in div. per share deflated by div. 
rather than price: decreases only 
-80.71 -60.00 -35.21 -11.50 -4.74 -2.09 -0.63 
   ∆ in div. per share deflated by div. 
rather than price: increases only 
 0.82  3.41  7.53  15.58  32.38  69.56  278.12 
Panel B: Frequency of Dividend Changes by Year 
Year Number of decreases 
Number of no-
changes 
Number of increases Total for year 
2008 393 27 153 573 
2009 132 32 370 534 
2010 88 24 446 558 
2011 105 50 469 624 
2012 156 40 481 677 
2013 151 37 516 704 
2014 128 26 574 728 
2015 274 48 447 769 
2016 296 43 469 808 
2017 217 47 606 870 
Total for category 1723 374 4531 6845 
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4. Analyses and results 
The empirical study is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on categorical analyses and 
the second part covers regression analyses. Together the analyses will be able to provide insights 
on both main hypotheses. 
4.1 Categorical analyses  
In the first step, each dividend change observation is divided into either dividend decreasing 
group, no-change in dividend group or into a quintile corresponding the magnitude of increase in 
dividends. Quintile 1 represents the lowest dividend increases and quintile 5 represents the 
highest dividend increases. The dividend changes are defined as: 




where Di,0 is the dividend per share in year 0, and Di,-1 is the dividend per share in year -1, i.e. the 
percentage change in annual dividend per share. 
The second step is to calculate the unexpected earnings for all the dividend change observation 
from year 0 to year 2. Unexpected earnings are estimated in two ways in this study. In Panel A, 





where UEi,t is the unexpected earnings in year t, Ei,t denotes earnings in year t, and MVi,-1 is the 
closing market value of equity for the previous year from the dividend change. This paper decides 
to deflate the change in earnings by the market value of equity, as recommended by Benartzi, 
Michaely and Thaler (1997) instead of book value of equity, which is used by Nissim and Ziv 
(2001). 
In the second approach, the random walk of earnings growth is corrected with the average five-
year earnings drift of the company, to control firms’ average long-term growth rates. Relationship 
of the earnings drift has been documented in the accounting literature by Foster (1977). As such, 





where UEi,t is the unexpected earnings in year t, Ei,t denotes earnings in year t, and MVi,-1 is the 
closing market value of equity for the previous year from the dividend change.  
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Table 2 reports the median and mean unexpected earnings along with respective significance 
levels for all the dividend change categories. The main focus in the analyses is on whether the 
earnings changes of dividend changing groups are statistically different from the no-change group 
and on which direction. In Panel A, significance levels are calculated in comparison to the no-
change group, and in Panel B, significance levels measure if the adjusted earnings changes are 
significantly different from zero, measuring the firms’ ability to maintain the same growth rate as 
in the previous years, as the earnings are already corrected with the drift.  
In Panel A, the relationship between dividend changes and unexpected earnings is strong in year 
0, as higher dividend changes imply significantly higher earnings changes for each of the groups 
on both means and medians. In year 0, the no-change group experience a decline of 1.10% in 
earnings, and for the dividend decreasing group the earnings decline 2.28% on average, while all 
dividend increasing groups experience positive changes in earnings, showing strong relationship 
between the magnitude of change in dividends and earnings. 
However, the same correlation does not apply for the following years, as all of the observations 
on year 1 are statistically insignificant. In year 2, there is only a small number of significant 
earnings changes, but the observations oppose the dividend signalling theory. Dividend increasing 
quintiles 3 and 5 show significantly lower average earnings growth than the no-change group, 
while the median of the dividend decreasing group is significantly higher than the reference 
group. Even while a few of the observations suggest a negative relationship, due to the low 
number of significant values in years 1 and 2, in Panel A, the relationship can be concluded to be 
insignificant.  
The results in Panel B are also unfavourable to the dividend signalling theory. Similarly to Panel 
A, the year 0 dividend changes are strongly correlated with earnings growth, but most of the 
observations in the following years are insignificant or show negative relationship with dividend 
changes with a wrong sign. Regarding both panels, the results do not suggest that the magnitude 
of dividend change is positively correlated with future unexpected earnings and even implies that 







Table 2: Earnings Growth After Dividend Changes 
This table reports earnings changes in year 0 and the two following years from the dividend change. Each observation 
is divided to a quintile by the magnitude of increasement in dividend, the no-change group or the dividend decreasing 
group. Dividend changes are defined as the percentage change in annual dividend per share. In Panel A, Raw earnings 
changes are the annual change in net income before extraordinary items, deflated by the market capitalization at the 
beginning of the year, as a percentage. In Panel B, earnings changes are defined as the annual change in earnings minus 






Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: Raw Earnings Changes (n = 6845) 
Decreases (-11.28)     -2.28*     -0.98** 1.40 0.51      1.71      0.78* 
No-change (0.00)     -1.10     -0.31 0.60 0.48      1.03      0.47 
Increases: quintile 1 (3.39)      0.72**      0.31** 1.24 0.51      0.40      0.32 
Increases: quintile 2 (8.85)      1.41**      0.63** 0.34 0.48      0.89      0.46 
Increases: quintile 3 (15.52)      1.66**      0.88** 0.92 0.47      0.13**      0.32 
Increases: quintile 4 (26.00)      2.00**      1.34** 0.44 0.67      0.69      0.43 
Increases: quintile 5 (69.19)      4.00**      2.54** 0.15 0.53      0.16*      0.39 
Panel B: Earnings Changes Minus 5-Year Drift (n = 6652) 
Decreases (-11.26)     -2.53**     -1.44**      1.52**      0.26**      1.56**      0.70** 
No-change (0.00)     -0.89     -0.60**      0.92      0.55*      1.07*      0.44* 
Increases: quintile 1 (3.38)      0.37     -0.27*      0.95**      0.20*      0.02     -0.11 
Increases: quintile 2 (8.78)      1.03**      0.09*      0.13     -0.06     -0.12     -0.01 
Increases: quintile 3 (15.33)      0.73*      0.27**      0.29     -0.09     -0.86**     -0.20* 
Increases: quintile 4 (25.20)      1.52**      0.74**     -0.13     -0.13     -0.25     -0.27* 
Increases: quintile 5 (66.67)      3.43**      1.58**     -0.88*     -0.35**     -0.66     -0.46** 
In Panel A: *, ** Significantly different from the no-change group at the 0.10 and 0.01 significance levels using two-tailed 
Student’s t-test for the means and a two-tailed Wilcoxon test for the medians. 
In Panel B: *, ** Significantly different from 0 at the 0.10 and 0.01 significance levels using two-tailed Student’s t-test 





4.2 Regression analyses 
The regression analyses are conducted using additional accounting data as control variables, 
making the sample sizes smaller due to data availability. The approach is to regress earnings 
changes from years 0, 1 and 2 to year 0 dividend changes and control variables from year t-1. 
With this method, it is possible to see if dividend changes add explanatory power to the 
development of future earnings. All the control variables are applied to the regression from a year 
prior to the earnings change, as only information that is known before the earnings 
announcements could have been used to predict the changes in earnings. The results of the 
regression analyses are reported in Table 3. 
In the regressions, earnings are assumed to follow a random walk, and dividend changes are 
defined as the percentage change in the annual dividend per share. In Panel A, earnings changes 
are regressed on the dividend changes only, and in Panel B, return on equity from year t-1 is 
added to the formula as an independent variable due to Nissim and Ziv (2001) suggesting it to be 
the most important variable to control for. In Panel C, all five chosen control variables are applied 
to the regression model to see if other variables can help explain earnings changes better than 
dividend changes.  
In Panels A and B, the relationship between dividend changes and unexpected earnings is 
significantly positive on year 0 with t-statistics over 17.0, but contrary to dividend signalling 
theory, turns significantly negative on the following years with t-statistics of lower than -2.9. 
However, it is worth noticing that the adjusted R2-values remain low throughout the regressions, 
with highest values being 0.05 for year 0, and 0.01 for the following years.  
In Panel C, the year 0 relationship is also significantly positive, but the explanatory power vanishes 
on the following years, as the effects are minor and insignificant. With the complete multivariate 
regression, the R2 increases in comparison to the previous regressions but remains low, with a 
value of 0.07 for year 0, and 0.01 for the following years. Altogether, the regression analyses fail 
to support the dividend signalling theory under each specification, with the simplest forms of 






Table 3: Explanatory Power of Dividend Changes on Future Earnings 
In the regression models the dependent variable (Ei,t – Ei,t-1)/MVi,-1 is the annual change in net income 
before extraordinary items, deflated by the market capitalization at the end of year -1. ∆DIVi,0 is the 
percentage change in annual dividend per share in year 0. ROEi,t-1 is the return on equity of year t-1, 
ROAi,t-1 is the return on assets in year t-1, GMAi,t-1 is the gross profit margin in year t-1, REVi,t-1 is the 
annual change in revenue in year t-1 as a percentage, and DEi,t-1 is the debt to equity ratio of year t-1. 
 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
 Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic 
Panel A: Coefficient Estimates for the Univariate Regression Model 
(𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1)
𝑀𝑉𝑖,−1
=  𝛼 +  𝛽∆𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,0 + ɛ𝑖,𝑡 
Intercept     -0.0009      (-0.856)      0.0093      (7.902)      0.0082      (8.064) 
∆Div      0.0441      (17.357)     -0.0117     (-4.169)     -0.0111     (-4.540) 
Adj. R2      0.0436       0.0025       0.0030  
N       6845        6808        6789  
Panel B: Coefficient Estimates for the Multivariate Regression Model, Controlling for ROE 
(𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1)
𝑀𝑉𝑖,−1
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,0 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + ɛ𝑖,𝑡 
Intercept      0.0035      (1.898)      0.0181      (9.002)      0.0118      (7.247) 
∆Div      0.0482     (17.096)     -0.0092     (-2.972)     -0.0076     (-2.944) 
ROE     -0.0341      (-4.56)     -0.0521     (-6.153)     -0.0296     (-4.188) 
Adj. R2      0.0547       0.0088       0.0051  
N       5465        5398        5366  
Panel C: Coefficient Estimates for the Complete Multivariate Regression Model 
(𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1)
𝑀𝑉𝑖,−1
=  𝛼 +  𝛽1∆𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,0 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽6𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + ɛ𝑖,𝑡 
Intercept     -0.0049     (-1.178)      0.0036      (0.729)      0.0000     (-0.013) 
∆Div      0.0411     (13.101)     -0.0054     (-1.247)     -0.0036     (-1.102) 
ROE     -0.0102     (-0.519)     -0.0289     (-1.578)     -0.0520     (-2.487) 
ROA     -0.5580     (-1.132)     -0.0102     (-0.180)      0.0493      (0.962) 
GMA      0.0079      (1.034)      0.0009      (0.096)      0.0124      (1.677) 
REV      0.0036      (0.372)     -0.0173     (-1.351)     -0.0105     (-1.025) 
DE      0.0021      (0.609)      0.0122      (3.095)      0.0107      (3.051) 
Adj. R2      0.0718       0.0085       0.0079  





4.3 Robustness checks 
This study tests the reliability of the results by running the complete multivariate regression with 
alterations to the data samples. The first test examines if there are regional differences inside the 
main data set, and the second test inspects whether the results are affected by a change in the 
collection time period of the data. 
The main data set is based on the United Nations geoscheme, which unlike some other 
definitions, includes the United Kingdom as a part of Northern Europe. As the companies from 
United Kingdom account for approximately half of the total dividend change observations, for the 
first robustness test, this study further divides the main data to two samples: companies from the 
United Kingdom and companies from Northern Europe (by the definition of EuroVoc). The results 
of the first test are reported in Panels A and B of Table 4. 
The second robustness test examines if changing the time period from which the data was 
collected affects the results. Particularly, as the time period of the original data set begins from 
2008, the results may be impacted by the financial crisis of 2008 and the following Great 
Recession. The characteristics of the firms in the following data sample are corresponding to the 
original but take place ten years prior. The results of the second robustness test are reported in 
Panel C of Table 4. 
In Panels A and B, the results stay robust with the previous regression, and both United Kingdom 
and Northern Europe samples suggest significant positive relationship between dividend changes 
and unexpected earnings in year 0 with t-statistics of over 8.8. In the following years, the 
coefficients of dividend changes are statistically insignificant, implying no major differences 
between the geographical areas. 
In Panel C, the results follow a similar pattern that was seen in the previous regressions. In year 
0, the relationship between dividend changes and unexpected earnings is positive and significant 
with a t-statistic of 12.3, but for the following years, dividend changes fail to employ any 
statistically significant explanatory power. As a conclusion, both occasions of robustness tests 







Table 4: Robustness Tests 
In the regression model the dependent variable (Ei,t – Ei,t-1)/MVi,-1 is the annual change in net income 
before extraordinary items, deflated by the market capitalization at the end of year -1. ∆DIVi,0 is the 
percentage change in annual dividend per share in year 0. ROEi,t-1 is the return on equity of year t-1, 
ROAi,t-1 is the return on assets in year t-1, GMAi,t-1 is the gross profit margin in year t-1, REVi,t-1 is the 
annual change in revenue in year t-1 as a percentage, and DEi,t-1 is the debt to equity ratio of year t-1. 
(𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1)
𝑀𝑉𝑖,−1
=  𝛼 +  𝛽1∆𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,0 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽6𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + ɛ𝑖,𝑡 
 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
 Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic 
Panel A: Coefficient Estimates for the Multivariate Regression Model of Firms from Northern Europe 
Intercept     -0.0043     (-0.770)     -0.0019     (-0.307)     -0.0005     (-0.096) 
∆Div      0.0399     (11.357)      0.0072      (1.629)     -0.0039     (-0.996) 
ROE     -0.0666     (-1.740)     -0.1166     (-2.572)     -0.0906     (-2.263) 
ROA      0.0495      (0.626)      0.1559      (1.641)      0.1244      (1.457) 
GMA      0.0002      (0.021)      0.0007      (0.060)      0.0173      (1.672) 
REV     -0.0082     (-0.815)     -0.0317     (-2.174)     -0.0232     (-1.741) 
DE      0.0138      (2.719)      0.0202      (3.359)      0.0137      (2.432) 
Adj. R2      0.1135       0.0174       0.0138  
N       1188        1174        1136  
Panel B: Coefficient Estimates for the Multivariate Regression Model of firms from the United Kingdom 
Intercept     -0.0086     (-1.367)      0.0081      (1.139)     -0.0024     (-0.390) 
∆Div      0.0506      (8.821)     -0.0120     (-1.583)     -0.0004     (-0.074) 
ROE      0.0019      (0.102)     -0.0449     (-2.685)     -0.0291     (-1.506) 
ROA     -0.0430     (-0.678)      0.0433      (1.597)      0.0315      (0.479) 
GMA     -0.0009     (-0.081)     -0.0114     (-0.831)      0.0035      (0.320) 
REV      0.0216      (1.691)     -0.0184     (-1.057)     -0.0103     (-0.694) 
DE      0.0028      (0.647)      0.0151      (3.423)      0.0128      (3.089) 
Adj. R2      0.0626       0.0143       0.0067  
N       1145        1136        1052  
Panel C: Coefficient Estimates for the Multivariate Regression Model from 1998-2007 
Intercept      0.0208      (4.949)      0.0064      (1.540)      0.0094      (1.904) 
∆Div      0.0414     (12.272)      0.0012      (0.326)     -0.0051     (-1.254) 
ROE     -0.0596     (-3.633)     -0.0224     (-1.223)     -0.0799     (-4.279) 
ROA     -0.0744     (-2.065)     -0.0465     (-1.094)      0.0188      (0.420) 
GMA      0.0013      (0.192)     -0.0074     (-1.097)     -0.0142     (-1.643) 
REV     -0.200     (-3.507)      0.0001      (0.025)     -0.0090     (-0.951) 
DE      0.0052      (1.753)      0.0031      (1.191)      0.0100      (3.500) 
Adj. R2      0.0729       0.0026       0.0141  







In this study I examine if changes in dividends can help explain changes in companies’ future 
earnings, testing the debated dividend signalling theory. As paying dividends is costly to firms, it 
is not surprising that the market treats the changes as newsworthy. I capture the effects of 
dividend changes by using annual percentage change as an independent variable in regressions 
to see if the explanatory power on future unexpected earnings is statistically significant. I also 
examine if the magnitude of dividend changes correlates with the level of earnings changes with 
categorical analyses. The data set consists of public companies that are exchanged in Northern 
Europe, containing 6845 observations on dividend changes from 2008-2017. 
I find no evidence to back up the dividend signalling theory, as significant positive relationship 
between dividend changes and future earnings changes is not found in the regression analyses, 
even though the correlation is significant on the year of the dividend change. Also, to an extent, 
the categorical analyses imply that the firms’ that do not change dividends perform better than 
dividend increasing groups, while also showing worse results than the dividend decreasing group. 
As a conclusion, the findings of thesis suggest that dividend changes cannot reliably be used to 









Arnott and Asness (2003). Surprise! Higher Dividends = Higher Earnings Growth, Financial 
Analysts Journal 59, 70-87 
Asquith and Mullins (1986). The Impact of Initiating Dividend Payments on Shareholders' 
Wealth, The Journal of Business 56, 77-96 
Asquith and Mullins (1986). Signalling with Dividends, Stock Repurchases, and Equity Issues, 
Financial Management 15, 27-44 
Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997). Do Changes in Dividends Signal the Future  or the Past?, 
The Journal of Finance 52, 1007-1034 
Bernheim (1990). Tax policy and the dividend puzzle, Rand Journal of Economics 22, 455-476. 
Bhattacharya (1979). Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy, 
The Bell Journal of Economics 10, 259-270 
Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005). Payout policy in the 21st century, Journal of 
Financial Economics 77, 483-527 
DeAngelo and Skinner (1996). Reversal of fortune dividend signaling and the disappearance of 
sustained earnings growth, Journal of Financial Economics 40, 341-371 
Feldstein and Green (1979). Why Do Companies Pay Dividends?, The American Economic Review 
73, 17-30 
Foster (1977). Quarterly Accounting Data: Time-Series Properties and Predictive-Ability Results, 
The Accounting Review 52, 1-21 
Gonedes (1978). Corporate Signaling, External Accounting, and Capital Market Equilibrium: 
Evidence on Dividends, Income, and Extraordinary Items, Journal of Accounting Research 16, 26-
79 
Grullon, Michaely and Benartzi (2003). Dividend Changes Do Not Signal Changes in Future 
Profitability, The Journal of Business 78, 1659-1682 
Healy and Palepu (1988). Earnings information conveyed by dividend initiations and omissions, 
Journal of Financial Economics 21, 149-175 
Jensen (1986). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, The 
American Economic Review 76, 323-329 
John and Williams (1985). Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium, The Journal of 
Finance 40, 1053-1070 
19 
 
Keown, Scott, Martin and Petty (2000). Foundations of Finance: The Logic and Practice of 
Financial Management, New Jersey: Prentice Hall 
Lintner (1956). Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained Earnings, 
and Taxes, The American Economic Review 46, 97-113 
Manakyan and Carroll (1990), An Empirical Examination of the Existence of a signaling value 
function for dividends, The Journal of Financial Research 13, 201-210 
Miller and Modigliani (1961). Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares, The Journal 
of Business 34, 411-433 
Miller and Rock (1985). Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information, The Journal of Finance 
40, 1031-1051 
Nissim and Ziv (2001). Dividend Changes and Future Profitability, The Journal of Finance 56, 
2111-2133 
Ogden, Jen and O’Connor (2003). Advanced corporate finance: Policies and strategies. Pearson 
College Division. 
Ou and Penman (1989). Financial statement analysis and the prediction of stock returns, Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 11, 295-329 
Watts (1973). The Information Content of Dividends, The Journal of Business 46, 191-211 
Zhou and Ruland (2006). Dividend Payout and Future Earnings Growth, Financial Analysts 
Journal 62, 58-69 
 
 
